![]() ![]() Nonetheless, as this study shows, the EU retains a critical window of opportunity to impact the direction of trans-Mediterranean connectivity, as the future of Chinese investments remains far from certain in the post-COVID-19 period. In contrast, seasonally adjusted GDP decreased by 12.1% in the Eurozone during the second quarter of 2020, with the economies of the major EU Mediterranean actors, France and Italy, having contracted by 19.0% and Italy by 17.3% respectively compared to the same quarter of the previous year (Eurostat, 2020). Exceeding international analysts’ forecasts, China’s $268 billion of November 2020 exports represented the sixth consecutive month of export growth. According to Chinese statistics, China’s monthly exports in November 2020 rose 21.1% year-on-year (Deccan Herald, 2020). The Egyptian example is a case wherein the already deeply entrenched positions of China, Russia, and several Arab Gulf states show the necessity of EU system involvement to ensure a European role in trans-Mediterranean connectivity.Ĭhina’s apparent economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic would seem to place Beijing in pole position to deepen its influence over the development of trans-Mediterranean connectivity. ![]() The Moroccan example (as well as the Algerian example) also shows that if the European Union system does not work effectively to partner with North African nations to meet these requirements, then EU member states playing leading roles in trans-Mediterranean connectivity will partner with actors outside the EU system. These requirements reflect the two fundamental needs in Africa’s current growth phase more generally – increased commercial connectivity to consumer markets and a larger industrial manufacturing base. Morocco’s success has demonstrated that commercial corridors only emerge where the requisite large investments in port and rail infrastructure are coupled with an industrial base anchored in a manufacturing value chain. The central corridor based in Algeria was still in a formative state, with its rudimentary condition characterized by a jockeying among international actors to establish a successful corridor. ![]() Prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Morocco’s West Africa-to-Western Europe corridor was the most advanced in its development while the Egypt-based East Africa-to-Eastern Mediterranean-to Eastern/Central Europe corridor was at a more preliminary stage of development, albeit with enormous economic potential. Keys Factors for trans-Mediterranean Connectivity in the Post-COVID-19 Period The manner and extent to which the EU exercises leadership in the development of trans-Mediterranean connectivity will determine the parameters of its future geopolitical influence in North Africa and the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts to develop a comprehensive partnership with Africa as a whole. Egypt’s positive economic growth outlook raises the possibility that progress in establishing the eastern corridor could sufficiently surpass the other corridors to reorient commercial flows from those corridors. The existential rivalry between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will ensure that Turkey, along with its strategic partner Qatar, and the UAE will remain highly engaged across North Africa. The severe economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic could result in those actors exercising an outsized influence in reshaping the basic economic architecture and the geopolitics of trans-Mediterranean connectivity in the absence of European action.Ĭhina’s apparent early economic recovery may provide Beijing a new first-mover advantage in each of the three emerging trans-Mediterranean commercial transport corridors: Morocco’s West Africa-to-Western Europe corridor, an Algeria-anchored central Maghreb corridor, and the Egypt-based East Africa-to-Eastern and Central Europe corridor via the eastern Mediterranean. Prior to the pandemic’s outbreak, the European Union (EU) system already faced a pressing strategic challenge to form a coherent and effective policy in North Africa to respond to the increasingly significant roles played by China, Russia, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf states in the development of trans-Mediterranean connectivity. COVID-19 has reshuffled the deck in the strategic scramble to establish Europe-to-Africa commercial transportation corridors across the Mediterranean basin.
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